Vying for support: Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences

Anne Marie Go; Nikolaos Kokonas; J Rivas

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107489

Vying for support: Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences

Anne Marie Go, Nikolaos Kokonas, J Rivas

De La Salle University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We construct a model in which two opposing lobbyists bid for the support of
a legislator with an uncertain bias toward either lobbyist. Notably, high bias un-
certainty yields lobbyists offering low bids. In contrast, low bias uncertainty makes
lobbyists bid aggressively. Finally, for moderate bias uncertainty, we find a non-
monotonic relationship between the legislator's bias uncertainty and the lobbyists'
bids.

Original language	English
Article number	107489
Journal	Economic Modelling
Volume	156
Early online date	17 Jan 2026
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107489
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 17 Jan 2026

Data Availability Statement

No data was used for the research described in the article.

Keywords

Integrity threshold
Legislatures
Lobbying
Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107489Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

@article{2e249ee80eb74798869b8503f6566432,

title = "Vying for support: Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences",

abstract = "We construct a model in which two opposing lobbyists bid for the support of a legislator with an uncertain bias toward either lobbyist. Notably, high bias un- certainty yields lobbyists offering low bids. In contrast, low bias uncertainty makes lobbyists bid aggressively. Finally, for moderate bias uncertainty, we find a non- monotonic relationship between the legislator's bias uncertainty and the lobbyists' bids.",

keywords = "Integrity threshold, Legislatures, Lobbying, Uncertainty",

author = "Go, \{Anne Marie\} and Nikolaos Kokonas and J Rivas",

year = "2026",

month = jan,

day = "17",

doi = "10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107489",

language = "English",

volume = "156",

journal = "Economic Modelling",

issn = "0264-9993",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Vying for support

T2 - Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences

AU - Go, Anne Marie

AU - Kokonas, Nikolaos

AU - Rivas, J

PY - 2026/1/17

Y1 - 2026/1/17

N2 - We construct a model in which two opposing lobbyists bid for the support of a legislator with an uncertain bias toward either lobbyist. Notably, high bias un- certainty yields lobbyists offering low bids. In contrast, low bias uncertainty makes lobbyists bid aggressively. Finally, for moderate bias uncertainty, we find a non- monotonic relationship between the legislator's bias uncertainty and the lobbyists' bids.

AB - We construct a model in which two opposing lobbyists bid for the support of a legislator with an uncertain bias toward either lobbyist. Notably, high bias un- certainty yields lobbyists offering low bids. In contrast, low bias uncertainty makes lobbyists bid aggressively. Finally, for moderate bias uncertainty, we find a non- monotonic relationship between the legislator's bias uncertainty and the lobbyists' bids.

KW - Integrity threshold

KW - Legislatures

KW - Lobbying

KW - Uncertainty

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105028004679

U2 - 10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107489

DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107489

M3 - Article

SN - 0264-9993

VL - 156

JO - Economic Modelling

JF - Economic Modelling

M1 - 107489

ER -

Vying for support: Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences

Abstract

Data Availability Statement

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this