Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

Aron Toth; Javier Rivas Ruiz; Enriqueta Aragones

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.004

Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

Aron Toth, Javier Rivas Ruiz, Enriqueta Aragones

Institut d'Anàlisi Económica-CSIC and Barcelona GSE

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Abstract

We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	206-221
Number of pages	16
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	170
Early online date	20 Jan 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.004
Publication status	Published - 29 Feb 2020

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10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.004

Corruption_Paper_V4.PDFAccepted author manuscript, 418 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Javier Rivas Ruiz
- J.Rivasbath.acuk
- Department of Economics - Senior Lecturer
- Economic Theory
Person: Research & Teaching
Aron Toth
- A.Tothbath.acuk
- Department of Economics - Lecturer
Person: Research & Teaching

Cite this

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title = "Voter heterogeneity and political corruption",

abstract = "We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences.",

author = "Aron Toth and {Rivas Ruiz}, Javier and Enriqueta Aragones",

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AU - Toth, Aron

AU - Rivas Ruiz, Javier

AU - Aragones, Enriqueta

PY - 2020/2/29

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N2 - We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences.

AB - We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.004

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-2681

VL - 170

SP - 206

EP - 221

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

ER -

Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

Abstract

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Javier Rivas Ruiz

Aron Toth

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