Voter heterogeneity and political corruption

Aron Toth, Javier Rivas Ruiz, Enriqueta Aragones

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 7 Dec 2019

Cite this

Voter heterogeneity and political corruption. / Toth, Aron; Rivas Ruiz, Javier; Aragones, Enriqueta.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 07.12.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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