Tripartite Evolution Game of Railway Safety Supervision Under the Influence of Collusion Within the Enterprise

The National Railway Administration of the People’s Republic of China, the China State Railway Group Co., Ltd. and the front-line staff are the three main stakeholders in the railway safety supervision system, and their decision-making behaviors will directly affect the railway safety. In this paper, based on the organizational hierarchy of railway safety supervision system in China and accidental cause mechanism, considering the influence of collusion rewards and punishments between enterprise and staff, the tripartite evolutionary game model is built. According to the actual data of 2018, the complex phenomena and evolution forms in the game process are simulated, and the behavior evolution rules of the three parties in the game are revealed, as well as the controllable factors and methods for the evolution direction of the system are explored. Evolutionary simulation shows that the railway safety supervision system is at an ideal state, and the current policy and management system are in a scientific scope. Some parameters should be reasonably controlled, so as to guide the system evolution in the direction of Pareto optimality. The research can provide a theoretical reference for coordinating the relationship among the three parties, formulating regulatory policies and improving the ability to manage and control risks for railroads.