Time Allocation in Entrepreneurial Selling: Impact of Consumer Peer Learning and Incumbent Reaction

Yufei Huang, Onesun Steve Yoo, Bilal Gokpinar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

How should technology entrepreneurs allocate their time to potential customers? Considering two important dynamics that influence consumers’ purchase decisions regarding new technology products, namely, consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction, we study the tactical-level time allocation decision with a simple game-theoretic model. We offer an economic rationale for the entrepreneur’s optimal time allocation for different levels of consumer peer learning and incumbent reaction as well as different revenue distributions between the buyers, and we discuss theoretical and practical implications for technology entrepreneurship.
LanguageEnglish
Pages590 - 603
Number of pages14
JournalIEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
Volume65
Issue number4
Early online date18 Aug 2017
DOIs
StatusPublished - 1 Nov 2018

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Sales
Consumer products
Economics
Peers
Incumbents
Time allocation
Entrepreneurs
Revenue
Product technology
Buyers
Purchase decision
Game-theoretic models
Simple game
Technology entrepreneurship
Rationale

Cite this

Time Allocation in Entrepreneurial Selling: Impact of Consumer Peer Learning and Incumbent Reaction. / Huang, Yufei; Yoo, Onesun Steve; Gokpinar, Bilal.

In: IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 65, No. 4, 01.11.2018, p. 590 - 603.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Huang, Yufei ; Yoo, Onesun Steve ; Gokpinar, Bilal. / Time Allocation in Entrepreneurial Selling: Impact of Consumer Peer Learning and Incumbent Reaction. In: IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 2018 ; Vol. 65, No. 4. pp. 590 - 603.
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