The Structure of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Voting Procedures

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Abstract

We consider probabilistic voting procedures which map each feasible set of alternatives and each utility profile to a social choice lottery over the feasible set. It is shown that if we impose: (i) a probabilistic collective rationality condition known as regularity; (ii) probabilistic counterpart of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and citizens' sovereignty; (iii) a probabilistic positive association condition called monotonicity; then the coalitional power structure under a probabilistic voting procedure is characterized by weak random dictatorship
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)685--705
Number of pages21
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume19
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2002

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distribution of power
voting
dictatorship
regularity
sovereignty
rationality
citizen
Probabilistic voting

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The Structure of Coalitional Power under Probabilistic Voting Procedures. / Nandeibam, S.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 19, 07.2002, p. 685--705.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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