The Oslo protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?

Michael Finus, Sigve Tjotta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

The increasing number of international environmental agreements (IEAs), and the fact that under some agreements emissions have been reduced beyond agreed targets, are frequently viewed as success stories of international cooperation. We argue that success can only be measured if abatement targets under an IEA are compared with estimated abatement levels in the absence of a treaty, and are evaluated in terms of costs and benefits. We analyze the Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction, showing that this IEA is not the great leap forward when compared with the calculated Nash equilibrium and the social optimum. However, we also demonstrate that under the Oslo Protocol, more ambitious targets could not have been realized due to strong free rider incentives.
LanguageEnglish
Pages2031-2048
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume87
Issue number9-10
DOIs
StatusPublished - Sep 2003

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International environmental agreements
Abatement
Social optimum
International cooperation
Free riders
Nash equilibrium
Treaties
Incentives
Costs and benefits

Cite this

The Oslo protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward? / Finus, Michael; Tjotta, Sigve.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, No. 9-10, 09.2003, p. 2031-2048.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Finus, Michael ; Tjotta, Sigve. / The Oslo protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2003 ; Vol. 87, No. 9-10. pp. 2031-2048
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