The generational bargain

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper builds on the notion of a bargain or contract across the generations. It argues that the idea of a generational bargain is helpful when thinking about a range of problems in economic and social policy, from pension reform to the extended family. The standard bargain (usually implicit) is that the working generation makes transfers of human capital to the young and consumption to the old on the understanding that other generations will behave in a similar way. Thus there are at least three generations involved in the process. The paper examines the roles of altruism and of self-interest in generational transfers and the stability of the bargain against "bad" behaviour by particular generations and against fractures in the generational cluster.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)54-65
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Social Welfare
Volume10
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2001

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pension reform
extended family
altruism
Economic Policy
human capital
Social Policy

Keywords

  • generational contract
  • generations
  • human capital
  • pensions
  • altruism
  • generational bargain

Cite this

The generational bargain. / Collard, D. A.

In: International Journal of Social Welfare, Vol. 10, No. 1, 01.2001, p. 54-65.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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