The GATT and gradualism

Benjamin Zissimos

doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.06.004

The GATT and gradualism

Benjamin Zissimos

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	410-33
Number of pages	24
Journal	Journal of International Economics
Volume	71
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.06.004
Publication status	Published - 2007

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10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.06.004

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The GATT and gradualism

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