The GATT and gradualism

Benjamin Zissimos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Citations (SciVal)


This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)410-33
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of International Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2007


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