The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases

Paul A. Grout; Anna Zalewska

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017

The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases

Paul A. Grout, Anna Zalewska

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	12-15
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	114
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017
Publication status	Published - Jan 2012

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title = "The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases",

abstract = "We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.",

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017

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The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases

Abstract

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