TY - JOUR
T1 - The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases
AU - Grout, Paul A.
AU - Zalewska, Anna
PY - 2012/1
Y1 - 2012/1
N2 - We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.
AB - We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80053628718&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.017
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 114
SP - 12
EP - 15
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
IS - 1
ER -