The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases

Paul A. Grout, Anna Zalewska

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide a simple asymmetric information model showing that, in contrast to portfolio diversification arguments, there is a natural complementarity between executive options and stock ownership. Moreover, managers can be made worse off by being granted more executive options.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)12-15
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume114
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2012

Fingerprint

Executive options
Purchase
Complementarity
Managers
Information model
Portfolio diversification
Ownership
Asymmetric information

Cite this

The effect of option granting on executive stock purchases. / Grout, Paul A.; Zalewska, Anna.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 114, No. 1, 01.2012, p. 12-15.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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