Taxing multinationals in the presence of internal capital markets

Marko Koethenbuerger, Michael Stimmelmayr

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

There is ample evidence that internal capital markets incur efficiency costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This paper analyzes whether tax avoidance behavior interacts with these costs and how policies of competing governments respond to it. We show that the interaction in itself may lead to profit taxes that are inefficiently high (low), provided the costs are attenuated (magnified) by higher profit taxes. Further, internal efficiency costs might render infrastructure provision inefficiently low. We also clarify the implications of the decision to set up an internal capital market and of external finance for the behavior of competing governments. The results are consistent with empirical findings that are not inherently related to the notion of fiscal competition.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)58-71
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume138
Issue number1
Early online date27 Apr 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016

Keywords

  • Fiscal competition Multinational firms Internal efficiency costs Managerial behavior Corporate tax avoidance

Cite this

Taxing multinationals in the presence of internal capital markets. / Koethenbuerger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 138, No. 1, 01.06.2016, p. 58-71.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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