Tax-versus-trading and efficient revenue recycling as issues for greenhouse gas abatement

J.C.V. Pezzey, F. Jotzo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission abatement, using the first multi-party model to include both tax-versus-trading under uncertainties, and revenue recycling. Including multiple, independent parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions (permit) trading in handling abatement-cost uncertainties, from that shown by existing, single-party literature. But a previously ignored and much bigger advantage of a tax, from better handling uncertainties in business-as-usual emissions, greatly boosts the overall tax-versus-trading advantage. Yet the degree to which each mechanism is used to raise and recycle revenue efficiently by lowering distortionary taxes - rather than recycle revenue as lump sums, or not raise revenue by giving tax thresholds or free permits - may in turn dominate any tax-versus-trading advantage. Choosing the best greenhouse abatement mechanism should thus consider the issues of tax-versus-trading and efficient revenue recycling together.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)230-236
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume64
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2012

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greenhouse gas
recycling
abatement cost
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Revenue
Tax
Abatement
Greenhouse gases
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Tax-versus-trading and efficient revenue recycling as issues for greenhouse gas abatement. / Pezzey, J.C.V.; Jotzo, F.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 64, No. 2, 01.09.2012, p. 230-236.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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