TY - JOUR
T1 - Tax competition reconsidered
AU - Dhillon, Amrita
AU - Wooders, Myrna
AU - Zissimos, Benjamin
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.
AB - In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x
M3 - Article
SN - 1097-3923
VL - 9
SP - 391
EP - 423
JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory
IS - 3
ER -