Tax competition reconsidered

Amrita Dhillon, Myrna Wooders, Benjamin Zissimos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Citations (SciVal)


In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-423
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2007


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