Strategically Equivalent Contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Roman M. Sheremeta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • 4 Citations

Abstract

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

LanguageEnglish
Pages587-601
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume78
Issue number4
DOIs
StatusPublished - 17 May 2014

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Strategically Equivalent Contests. / Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.

In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 78, No. 4, 17.05.2014, p. 587-601.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chowdhury, SM & Sheremeta, RM 2014, 'Strategically Equivalent Contests' Theory and Decision, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 587-601. DOI: 10.1007%2Fs11238-014-9440-5
Chowdhury SM, Sheremeta RM. Strategically Equivalent Contests. Theory and Decision. 2014 May 17;78(4):587-601. Available from, DOI: 10.1007%2Fs11238-014-9440-5
Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ; Sheremeta, Roman M./ Strategically Equivalent Contests. In: Theory and Decision. 2014 ; Vol. 78, No. 4. pp. 587-601
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