‘Spite effects’ in tax evasion experiments

John Cullis, Philip Jones, Amal Soliman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper sets out to consider individuals’ motivations to evade taxation. Experimental results indicate that individuals do not simply maximize pecuniary welfare. Their behaviour is consistent with the presence of a ‘previous termspitenext termprevious termeffectnext term’ when their perceptions are that enforcement variables are ‘excessive’.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)418-423
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Socio-Economics
Volume41
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2012

Fingerprint

Spite
Taxation
Experiment
Tax evasion
Enforcement

Cite this

‘Spite effects’ in tax evasion experiments. / Cullis, John; Jones, Philip; Soliman, Amal.

In: Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 41, No. 4, 08.2012, p. 418-423.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Cullis, John ; Jones, Philip ; Soliman, Amal. / ‘Spite effects’ in tax evasion experiments. In: Journal of Socio-Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 41, No. 4. pp. 418-423.
@article{e052455ed72545e287245ac5ae20168d,
title = "‘Spite effects’ in tax evasion experiments",
abstract = "This paper sets out to consider individuals’ motivations to evade taxation. Experimental results indicate that individuals do not simply maximize pecuniary welfare. Their behaviour is consistent with the presence of a ‘previous termspitenext termprevious termeffectnext term’ when their perceptions are that enforcement variables are ‘excessive’.",
author = "John Cullis and Philip Jones and Amal Soliman",
year = "2012",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1016/j.socec.2011.05.011",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "418--423",
journal = "Journal of Socio-Economics",
issn = "1053-5357",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - ‘Spite effects’ in tax evasion experiments

AU - Cullis, John

AU - Jones, Philip

AU - Soliman, Amal

PY - 2012/8

Y1 - 2012/8

N2 - This paper sets out to consider individuals’ motivations to evade taxation. Experimental results indicate that individuals do not simply maximize pecuniary welfare. Their behaviour is consistent with the presence of a ‘previous termspitenext termprevious termeffectnext term’ when their perceptions are that enforcement variables are ‘excessive’.

AB - This paper sets out to consider individuals’ motivations to evade taxation. Experimental results indicate that individuals do not simply maximize pecuniary welfare. Their behaviour is consistent with the presence of a ‘previous termspitenext termprevious termeffectnext term’ when their perceptions are that enforcement variables are ‘excessive’.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84861929317&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2011.05.011

U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2011.05.011

DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2011.05.011

M3 - Article

VL - 41

SP - 418

EP - 423

JO - Journal of Socio-Economics

JF - Journal of Socio-Economics

SN - 1053-5357

IS - 4

ER -