Some arguments against the ‘paradigms narrative’ in research methodology

In sport and exercise research, ideas from the philosophy of science hold a curious influence within research training, publication practices and frameworks of evaluating research quality. In disciplines that draw from the natural sciences – physiology, nutrition, sports medicine, biomechanics – there appears to be relatively little explicit reference to philosophy of science at doctoral level or in published journal articles. In disciplines that draw from the social sciences – sports psychology, sociology of sport, sport management, physical education – the philosophy of science is reduced into what we refer to as the paradigms narrative. In this narrative, differences between research practices are explained by the existence of diverse ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions which give rise to distinctive so-called paradigms (Lincoln et al., 2011). Researchers are encouraged to recognise their own paradigmatic assumptions, align their practices and language to that paradigm and appreciate that other researchers might be operating within different paradigms to themselves (see Sparkes and Smith, 2013; Landi, 2023). Part of a larger project investigating whether the philosophy of science could be used more effectively across the sport and exercise sciences, this paper outlines some key arguments against the paradigms narrative and concludes with view that it ought to be rejected or significantly revised within research training. First, we consider the incommensurability norm in the paradigms narrative and argue that it is not sustainable to proceed as if studies only make sense within the terms of reference of the paradigm in which they are operating. Second, we consider the personal choice norm whereby paradigms are treated as though they are indicative of researchers’ foundational subjective identities. We argue against this norm in favour of a more collective vision for agreed best practices that shift focus away from personal choice. Finally, we address the claim that particular methods – most often the qualitative/quantitative binary – are treated as if they are necessarily derived from particular paradigmatic assumptions. Through using illustrative examples we argue that a diverse plethora of methods can be used coherently together with different ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions without being contradictory. Our paper closes with some brief suggestions about a path forward.