We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of Ω (√n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.
|Title of host publication||Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems|
|Editors||N. Osman, C. Sierra|
|Publisher||Springer, Cham; Fondazione C.I.M.E., Florence|
|Number of pages||21|
|Publication status||Published - 24 Sep 2016|