“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Sang-Hyun Kim

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury
, Sang-Hyun Kim

University of East Anglia
Yonsei University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Citations (SciVal)

128 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	486-493
Number of pages	8
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	104
Early online date	3 Jun 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2017

Keywords

contest design
multiple winner
group-size
selection mechanism

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012

Small yet beautiful (PDF)Accepted author manuscript, 212 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63705

Cite this

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AB - We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.

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“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests

Abstract

Keywords

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