“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim

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Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests.
LanguageEnglish
Pages486-493
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume104
Early online date3 Jun 2017
DOIs
StatusPublished - Jul 2017

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“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the Optimal Design of Multi-winner Contests. / Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Sang-Hyun.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 104, 07.2017, p. 486-493.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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