Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?

Michael Finus, B Rundshagen, J Eyckmans

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)
150 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements, considering a sequential coalition formation process of heterogeneous and farsighted players. Players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by alternative proposals. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing and solving such a game and the strategic options arising in a sequential process. This is illustrated with simple examples and with numerical simulations using the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5-23
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Volume220
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2014

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