Sharing rules in teams

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)407-420
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume107
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2002

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Sharing rule
Production process
Limited liability
Non-cooperative game
Moral hazard

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Sharing rules in teams. / Nandeibam, Shasikanta.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 107, No. 2, 12.2002, p. 407-420.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Nandeibam, Shasikanta. / Sharing rules in teams. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2002 ; Vol. 107, No. 2. pp. 407-420.
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