Self-Reference Acts as a Golden Thread in Binding

Jie Sui

Research output: Contribution to journalLetter

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent article in this journal, Glyn Humphreys and I proposed a model of how self-reference enhances binding in perception and cognition [1]. We showed that self-reference changes particular functional processes; notably, self-reference increases binding between the features of stimuli and between different stages of processing. Lane and colleagues [2] provide an interesting comment on our article that suggests our theory of self-reference is compatible with Dennett's philosophical perspective on the narrative nature of the self. Although the nature of the self has attracted the attention of both philosophers and scientists, the two disciplines have generated different perspectives on the functions of the self, largely due to their different methodologies. For example, Dennett argues that the self is constituted through human narration on experience [3]. By contrast, work from psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists focuses on the functional and neural mechanisms of self-reference.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)482-483
Number of pages2
JournalTrends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume20
Issue number7
Early online date14 Jun 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2016

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Narration
Cognition
Psychology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Cognitive Neuroscience

Cite this

Self-Reference Acts as a Golden Thread in Binding. / Sui, Jie.

In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 7, 01.07.2016, p. 482-483.

Research output: Contribution to journalLetter

Sui, Jie. / Self-Reference Acts as a Golden Thread in Binding. In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2016 ; Vol. 20, No. 7. pp. 482-483.
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