Rent-sharing or incentives? Estimating the residual claim of average employees

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Abstract

The rent-sharing literature and the agency literature both predict a link between pay and performance. The rent-sharing literature relies on short-term market power to explain this link, while the agency literature bases its prediction on the importance of incentives in principal-agent relationships. Annual data from an unbalanced panel of US manufacturing firms indicate that the performance-elasticity of average employee pay is approximately 0.127271 in small firms while it not significantly different from zero in large firms. The relative lack of incentive pay in the group of large firms demonstrates that the pay-performance link evident in US manufacturing firms is inconsistent with the exclusive truth of the rent-sharing hypothesis.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)725-728
Number of pages4
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume4
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1997

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Rent sharing
Incentives
Employees
Manufacturing firms
Large firms
Prediction
Performance pay
Small firms
Principal-agent relationship
Elasticity
Unbalanced panels
Incentive pay
Market power

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Rent-sharing or incentives? Estimating the residual claim of average employees. / Rayton, Bruce.

In: Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 4, No. 12, 12.1997, p. 725-728.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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