Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter?

Alfred Endres, Michael Finus

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame Theory and the Environment
EditorsNick Hanley, Henk Folmer
Place of PublicationCheltenham
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Pages135-164
Number of pages30
ISBN (Print)9781858984155
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Cite this

Endres, A., & Finus, M. (1998). Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? In N. Hanley, & H. Folmer (Eds.), Game Theory and the Environment (pp. 135-164). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? / Endres, Alfred; Finus, Michael.

Game Theory and the Environment. ed. / Nick Hanley; Henk Folmer. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1998. p. 135-164.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Endres, A & Finus, M 1998, Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? in N Hanley & H Folmer (eds), Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, pp. 135-164.
Endres A, Finus M. Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? In Hanley N, Folmer H, editors, Game Theory and the Environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1998. p. 135-164
Endres, Alfred ; Finus, Michael. / Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter?. Game Theory and the Environment. editor / Nick Hanley ; Henk Folmer. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1998. pp. 135-164
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