Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter?

Alfred Endres, Michael Finus

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame Theory and the Environment
EditorsNick Hanley, Henk Folmer
Place of PublicationCheltenham
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Pages135-164
Number of pages30
ISBN (Print)9781858984155
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Cite this

Endres, A., & Finus, M. (1998). Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a bargaining game over global emission reductions: does the instrumental framework matter? In N. Hanley, & H. Folmer (Eds.), Game Theory and the Environment (pp. 135-164). Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.