Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS

Eleonora Fichera, Hugh Gravelle, Mario Pezzino, Matt Sutton

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/2011, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser’s population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)811-822
Number of pages12
JournalThe European Journal of Health Economics
Volume17
Issue number7
Early online date11 Sep 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2016

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Negotiating
Delivery of Health Care
Public Sector
Health
Budgets
Contracts
England
Healthcare
Population

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Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS. / Fichera, Eleonora; Gravelle, Hugh; Pezzino, Mario; Sutton, Matt .

In: The European Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 17, No. 7, 09.2016, p. 811-822.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Fichera, Eleonora ; Gravelle, Hugh ; Pezzino, Mario ; Sutton, Matt . / Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS. In: The European Journal of Health Economics. 2016 ; Vol. 17, No. 7. pp. 811-822.
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