"Public Goods": An Exercise in Calibration

John Hudson, Philip Jones

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers a measure of the "publicness" of goods and services implicit in responses that individuals make when asked about public sector spending. At the limit, all consumers consume equal amounts of a public good. Thus any differences between an individual's self-interest preferences and public-interest preferences cannot be based on differential provision, but only on differences in the individual's public- and self-interest utility functions. If we rule out the latter, self-interest and public-interest preferences for a pure public good are identical. Using sample survey data it is possible to calibrate the public good content of different public goods.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)267-82
Number of pages16
JournalPublic Choice
Volume124
Issue number3-4
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Fingerprint

public interest
public sector
Calibration
Exercise
Public interest
Sample survey
Utility function
Public sector
Survey data

Keywords

  • Rent-seeking
  • and Voting Behavior (D720)
  • Elections
  • Models of Political Processes
  • Legislatures
  • Public Goods (H410)

Cite this

"Public Goods": An Exercise in Calibration. / Hudson, John; Jones, Philip.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 124, No. 3-4, 2005, p. 267-82.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Hudson, J & Jones, P 2005, '"Public Goods": An Exercise in Calibration', Public Choice, vol. 124, no. 3-4, pp. 267-82.
Hudson, John ; Jones, Philip. / "Public Goods": An Exercise in Calibration. In: Public Choice. 2005 ; Vol. 124, No. 3-4. pp. 267-82.
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