Probabilistic game approaches for network cost allocation

Rohit Bhakar, V. S. Sriram, Narayana Prasad Padhy, Hari Om Gupta

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

43 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage necessitates the introduction of probabilistic approaches to cooperative games. This paper proposes a variety of probabilistic cooperative game approaches. These have variably been modeled based upon the probability of existence of players, the probability of existence of coalitions, and the probability of players joining a particular coalition along with their joining in a particular sequence. Application of these approaches to power networks reflects the system usage in a more justified way. Consistent and stable results qualify the application of probabilistic cooperative game approaches for cost allocation of power networks.

Original languageEnglish
Article number5340559
Pages (from-to)51-58
Number of pages8
JournalIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2010

Keywords

  • Cooperative games
  • Embedded cost allocation
  • Probabilistic games
  • Transmission pricing

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