Political candidates’ attitudes towards group representation.

Hilde Coffe, Marion Reiser

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Scholarly debate over the role of the United States Congress in approving military action has focused on the respective war powers granted the executive and legislature by the United States Constitution. Although a voluminous literature has examined the institutional and partisan politics shaping their exercise, a conspicuous lacuna concerns nuclear war powers. Despite periodic but mostly ineffective reassertions of congressional prerogatives over war, the decision to employ nuclear weapons has been left entirely to presidential discretion since 1945. Explaining this consistent refusal by Congress to rein in the ultimate presidential power and exercise co-responsibility for the most devastating form of war relies less on disputatious constitutional grounds than on three arguments about congressional dysfunctionality, legislative irresponsibility, and the relative costs of collective action by federal lawmakers on perilous national security questions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)272-297
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Legislative Studies
Volume24
Issue number3
Early online date10 Sep 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Cite this

Political candidates’ attitudes towards group representation. / Coffe, Hilde; Reiser, Marion.

In: Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2018, p. 272-297.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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