Piracy in a two-sided software market

Alexander Rasch, Tobias Wenzel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sided-market setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)78-89
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume88
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2013

Fingerprint

Software
Piracy
Developer
Equilibrium price
License
Two-sided markets
Profit
Compatibility
Software piracy
Fees

Keywords

  • Developer
  • Piracy
  • Platform
  • Software
  • Two-sided market

Cite this

Piracy in a two-sided software market. / Rasch, Alexander; Wenzel, Tobias.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 88, 04.2013, p. 78-89.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rasch, Alexander ; Wenzel, Tobias. / Piracy in a two-sided software market. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2013 ; Vol. 88. pp. 78-89.
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