Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements

Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, Michael Finus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We consider seven different permit allocation schemes. Two "pragmatic schemes" allocate permits according to a uniform emission reduction quota, five "equitable schemes" allocate permits based on some normative criteria frequently discussed in the literature permit trading can raise participation and the success of climate agreements, but pragmatic schemes are superior to equitable ones.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)19-47
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Applied Economics
Volume9
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - May 2006

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Permit trading
Climate
Emission reduction
Module
Emission permits
Climate change
CO2 emissions
Participation

Cite this

Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements. / Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos; Finus, Michael.

In: Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 05.2006, p. 19-47.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos ; Finus, Michael. / Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements. In: Journal of Applied Economics. 2006 ; Vol. 9, No. 1. pp. 19-47.
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