Pay Dispersion and Executive Behaviour

Evidence from Innovation

Mario D. Amore, Virgilio Failla

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Compensation packages are widely used to motivate top executives. Pay dispersion among a firm's executives, however, can be associated with the antithetic effects of social comparison and individual motivation, with unclear implications for the company. We focus on innovation activities, which represent an important channel through which pay dispersion can affect firm performance, and test our predictions by exploring innovative output as a function of executives’ pay dispersion in a panel of US firms. We find that executive pay dispersion acts as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the higher the dispersion in variable pay, the higher the innovation. On the other hand, the larger the dispersion in fixed pay, the lower the innovation. Results are robust to a number of tests, such as restricting the analysis to executives with direct responsibility for innovation projects and considering individual incentives in the form of cash pay.

Original languageEnglish
JournalBritish Journal of Management
Early online date13 Dec 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 13 Dec 2018

Cite this

Pay Dispersion and Executive Behaviour : Evidence from Innovation. / Amore, Mario D.; Failla, Virgilio.

In: British Journal of Management, 13.12.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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