Participation in international environmental agreements: the role of timing and regulation

Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)165-200
Number of pages36
JournalNatural Resource Modeling
Volume19
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2006

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international organization
Timing
Welfare
Pareto
Regulator
Recommendations
Participation
co-ordination
recommendation
enforcement
regulation
participation

Cite this

Participation in international environmental agreements: the role of timing and regulation. / Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca.

In: Natural Resource Modeling, Vol. 19, No. 2, 06.2006, p. 165-200.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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