Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion

Saptarshi Ghosh, Peter Postl, Jaideep Roy

Research output: Working paper

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Abstract

We analyze the ‘optimal’ size of non-deliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is small, the optimal size is one; when it is intermediate, the optimal size increases monotonically in the precision of members’ private information; when it is large this relation is non-monotonic. However the optimal committee-size never exceeds five. We also show that biased persuasion typically hurts a
larger committee more severely. These results provide important implications on issues like universal enfranchisement, role of expert commentary in a democracy or size of governing boards in firms.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationBath, U. K.
PublisherDepartment of Economics, University of Bath
Publication statusPublished - 3 Jul 2017

Publication series

NameBath Economics Research Working Papers
Volume43/15

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Persuasion
Conflict of interest
Democracy
Private information

Cite this

Ghosh, S., Postl, P., & Roy, J. (2017). Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers; Vol. 43/15). Bath, U. K.: Department of Economics, University of Bath.

Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion. / Ghosh, Saptarshi; Postl, Peter; Roy, Jaideep.

Bath, U. K. : Department of Economics, University of Bath, 2017. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers; Vol. 43/15).

Research output: Working paper

Ghosh, S, Postl, P & Roy, J 2017 'Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion' Bath Economics Research Working Papers, vol. 43/15, Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, U. K.
Ghosh S, Postl P, Roy J. Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion. Bath, U. K.: Department of Economics, University of Bath. 2017 Jul 3. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers).
Ghosh, Saptarshi ; Postl, Peter ; Roy, Jaideep. / Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion. Bath, U. K. : Department of Economics, University of Bath, 2017. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers).
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