Optimal doubling strategy against a suboptimal opponent

Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Özgür Şimşek

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

For two-person zero-sum games, where the probability of each player winning is a continuous function of time and is known to both players, the mutually optimal strategy for proposing and accepting a doubling of the game value is known. We present an algorithm for deriving the optimal doubling strategy of a player who is aware of the suboptimal strategy followed by the opponent. We also present numerical results about the magnitude of the benefits; the results support the claim that repeated application of the algorithm by both players leads to the mutually optimal strategy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)867–872
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Applied Probability
Volume42
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2005

Keywords

  • Optimal strategy; gambling; doubling

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