On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Michael Finus; Pierre von Mouche; Bianca Rundshagen

On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Michael Finus
, Pierre von Mouche
, Bianca Rundshagen

Wageningen University and Research
FernUniversität in Hagen

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceeding › Book chapter

Abstract

For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to
existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new
equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Contributions to Game Theory and Management
Editors	Leon A Petrosyan, Nikolay A Zenkevich
Place of Publication	St Petersbrug
Publisher	St. Petersburg State University
Pages	51-60
Number of pages	10
Volume	VII
Publication status	Published - 2014
Event	The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management - St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia Duration: 26 Jun 2013 → 28 Jun 2013

Publication series

Name	Contributions to Game Theory and Management
Volume	VII
ISSN (Electronic)	2310-2608

Conference

Conference	The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management
Period	26/06/13 → 28/06/13

Cite this

On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. / Finus, Michael; von Mouche, Pierre; Rundshagen, Bianca.
Contributions to Game Theory and Management. ed. / Leon A Petrosyan; Nikolay A Zenkevich. Vol. VII St Petersbrug: St. Petersburg State University, 2014. p. 51-60 (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. VII).

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceeding › Book chapter

Finus, M, von Mouche, P & Rundshagen, B 2014, On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. in LA Petrosyan & NA Zenkevich (eds), Contributions to Game Theory and Management. vol. VII, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. VII, St. Petersburg State University, St Petersbrug, pp. 51-60, The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management, 26/06/13.

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AU - Finus, Michael

AU - von Mouche, Pierre

AU - Rundshagen, Bianca

PY - 2014

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N2 - For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.

AB - For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.

M3 - Book chapter

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T3 - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

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EP - 60

BT - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

A2 - Petrosyan, Leon A

A2 - Zenkevich, Nikolay A

PB - St. Petersburg State University

CY - St Petersbrug

T2 - The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management

Y2 - 26 June 2013 through 28 June 2013

ER -

On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Abstract

Publication series

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