For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to
existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new
equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Game Theory and Management
EditorsLeon A Petrosyan, Nikolay A Zenkevich
Place of PublicationSt Petersbrug
PublisherSt. Petersburg State University
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - 2014
EventThe Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management - St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Duration: 26 Jun 201328 Jun 2013

Publication series

NameContributions to Game Theory and Management
ISSN (Electronic)2310-2608


ConferenceThe Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management


Cite this

Finus, M., von Mouche, P., & Rundshagen, B. (2014). On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. In L. A. Petrosyan, & N. A. Zenkevich (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory and Management (Vol. VII, pp. 51-60). (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. VII). St Petersbrug: St. Petersburg State University.