Abstract

For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to
existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new
equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Game Theory and Management
EditorsLeon A Petrosyan, Nikolay A Zenkevich
Place of PublicationSt Petersbrug
PublisherSt. Petersburg State University
Pages51-60
Number of pages10
VolumeVII
Publication statusPublished - 2014
EventThe Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management - St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Duration: 26 Jun 201328 Jun 2013

Publication series

NameContributions to Game Theory and Management
VolumeVII
ISSN (Electronic)2310-2608

Conference

ConferenceThe Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management
Period26/06/1328/06/13

Fingerprint

Uniqueness
Coalition formation
Cournot

Cite this

Finus, M., von Mouche, P., & Rundshagen, B. (2014). On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. In L. A. Petrosyan, & N. A. Zenkevich (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory and Management (Vol. VII, pp. 51-60). (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. VII). St Petersbrug: St. Petersburg State University.

On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. / Finus, Michael; von Mouche, Pierre; Rundshagen, Bianca.

Contributions to Game Theory and Management. ed. / Leon A Petrosyan; Nikolay A Zenkevich. Vol. VII St Petersbrug : St. Petersburg State University, 2014. p. 51-60 (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. VII).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Finus, M, von Mouche, P & Rundshagen, B 2014, On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. in LA Petrosyan & NA Zenkevich (eds), Contributions to Game Theory and Management. vol. VII, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. VII, St. Petersburg State University, St Petersbrug, pp. 51-60, The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management, 26/06/13.
Finus M, von Mouche P, Rundshagen B. On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. In Petrosyan LA, Zenkevich NA, editors, Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Vol. VII. St Petersbrug: St. Petersburg State University. 2014. p. 51-60. (Contributions to Game Theory and Management).
Finus, Michael ; von Mouche, Pierre ; Rundshagen, Bianca. / On the Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. Contributions to Game Theory and Management. editor / Leon A Petrosyan ; Nikolay A Zenkevich. Vol. VII St Petersbrug : St. Petersburg State University, 2014. pp. 51-60 (Contributions to Game Theory and Management).
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