Abstract

For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to
existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new
equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Game Theory and Management
EditorsLeon A Petrosyan, Nikolay A Zenkevich
Place of PublicationSt Petersbrug
PublisherSt. Petersburg State University
Pages51-60
Number of pages10
VolumeVII
Publication statusPublished - 2014
EventThe Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management - St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Duration: 26 Jun 201328 Jun 2013

Publication series

NameContributions to Game Theory and Management
VolumeVII
ISSN (Electronic)2310-2608

Conference

ConferenceThe Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management
Period26/06/1328/06/13

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