Abstract
For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to
existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new
equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new
equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Contributions to Game Theory and Management |
| Editors | Leon A Petrosyan, Nikolay A Zenkevich |
| Place of Publication | St Petersbrug |
| Publisher | St. Petersburg State University |
| Pages | 51-60 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Volume | VII |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Event | The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management - St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia Duration: 26 Jun 2013 → 28 Jun 2013 |
Publication series
| Name | Contributions to Game Theory and Management |
|---|---|
| Volume | VII |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2310-2608 |
Conference
| Conference | The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management |
|---|---|
| Period | 26/06/13 → 28/06/13 |