@techreport{9588182fd6bc447d9a8911b5644c0587,
title = "On the Existence of Political Corruption",
abstract = "Political competition in proportional representation system between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. We analyse an environment where the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, the corrupt politician can win the majority, as the honest politician tries to trade off the cost of eliminating corruption (matching the corrupt politician's offer and thereby deviating from the socially desirable political platform) with its benefits.",
author = "Enriqueta Aragones and Javier Rivas and Aron Toth",
year = "2017",
month = nov,
day = "24",
language = "English",
series = "Bath Economics Research Papers",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Bath",
number = "67/17",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Bath",
}