On the Existence of Political Corruption

Enriqueta Aragones, Javier Rivas, Aron Toth

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

Abstract

Political competition in proportional representation system between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied. We analyse an environment where the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmetric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, the corrupt politician can win the majority, as the honest politician tries to trade off the cost of eliminating corruption (matching the corrupt politician's offer and thereby deviating from the socially desirable political platform) with its benefits.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationBath, U. K.
PublisherDepartment of Economics, University of Bath
Publication statusPublished - 24 Nov 2017

Publication series

NameBath Economics Research Papers
No.67/17

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