Abstract
In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 436-439 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 125 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2014 |
Keywords
- Biased lotteries
- Charities
- Public good provision
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Finance
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Jorg Franke
- Department of Economics - Senior Lecturer
- Microeconomic Theory
Person: Research & Teaching, Core staff
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