On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case

Jorg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)436-439
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume125
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2014

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Keywords

  • Biased lotteries
  • Charities
  • Public good provision

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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