On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case

Jorg Franke; Wolfgang Leininger

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.024

On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case

Jorg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger

Department of Economics

Technische Universität Dortmund

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	436-439
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	125
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.024
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2014

Keywords

Biased lotteries
Charities
Public good provision

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Finance

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.024

Cite this

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title = "On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case",

abstract = "In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.",

keywords = "Biased lotteries, Charities, Public good provision",

author = "Jorg Franke and Wolfgang Leininger",

year = "2014",

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T1 - On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries

T2 - The two player case

AU - Franke, Jorg

AU - Leininger, Wolfgang

PY - 2014/12/1

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N2 - In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.

AB - In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.

KW - Biased lotteries

KW - Charities

KW - Public good provision

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.024

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84910015893

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 125

SP - 436

EP - 439

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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Jorg Franke

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On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Jorg Franke

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