Abstract
Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood,
discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious
moral interests AI legal personhood might protect.
discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious
moral interests AI legal personhood might protect.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 273-291 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Artificial Intelligence and Law |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 8 Sept 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 30 Sept 2017 |
Keywords
- international organisations
- Legal personality
- artificial intelligence
- robots
- legal agency
- moral subject
- ethics