Abstract
Existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem. When an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested, he has to take into account the fact that he may, in turn, be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain, but from the other side. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion. Having done so, it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption. These turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 349-359 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Aug 1992 |
Bibliographical note
Published online on 5th March 2002.ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
