Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Subhasish Chowdhury; Roman Sheremeta

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.002

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Subhasish Chowdhury, Roman Sheremeta

Department of Economics

Chapman University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

43 Citations (SciVal)

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Abstract

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	216-219
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	112
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.002
Publication status	Published - Aug 2011

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title = "Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests",

abstract = "We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.",

author = "Subhasish Chowdhury and Roman Sheremeta",

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language = "English",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Sheremeta, Roman

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AB - We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

UR - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.002

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.002

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.002

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 112

SP - 216

EP - 219

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Abstract

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