Modesty may pay!

Michael Finus, Stefan Maus

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first-best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)801-826
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume10
Issue number5
Early online date3 Sep 2008
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2008

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