Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups

bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks

Alan Kirman, Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante, Paolo Pin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson–Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson–Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational ‘spatially’ myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1), which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours’ neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Computational experiments show that when this self-interested process of link formation operates at level 2 neighbourhoods, agents self-organize into stable and efficient network structures that manifest reciprocity, equity and segregation, reminiscent of hunter gather groups. A large literature alleges that this is incompatible with self-interested behaviour and market oriented marginality principle in the allocation of value. We conclude that it is not this valuation principle that needs to be altered to obtain segregated social networks as opposed to global components, but whether it operates at level 1 or 2 of social neighbourhoods. Remarkably, all M>2 neighbourhood calculations for payoffs leave the efficient network structures identical to the case when M=2.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2085-2107
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume31
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007

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Marginal contribution
Social networks
Bounded rationality
Self-organization
Equity
Network structure
Profitability
Local interaction
Shapley value
Segregation
Experiment
Marginality
Simple rules
NP-hard

Cite this

Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups : bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks. / Kirman, Alan; Markose, Sheri; Giansante, Simone; Pin, Paolo.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 31, No. 6, 06.2007, p. 2085-2107.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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