TY - JOUR
T1 - Learning in experiments
T2 - dynamic interaction of policy variables designed to deter tax evasion
AU - Soliman, Amal
AU - Jones, Philip
AU - Cullis, John
PY - 2014/2
Y1 - 2014/2
N2 - While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than observed levels of compliance. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.
AB - While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than observed levels of compliance. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.012
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84892861083&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.012
DO - 10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.012
M3 - Article
SN - 0167-4870
VL - 40
SP - 175
EP - 186
JO - Journal of Economic Psychology
JF - Journal of Economic Psychology
ER -