Abstract
Economic intuition suggests that enforcement errors incentivize crimes, therefore officers must be penalized for committing such errors. Legal scholars argue that if penalties for errors are severe, officers may become timid while policing (thereby encouraging crime). We evaluate these arguments in a model where officers invest in competence. Competence increases the officer's ability to identify criminals. Low sanctions for errors encourages bold policing by officers but may still raise the equilibrium level of crime because it also discourages investments in competence. Granting immunity to only competent officers (“qualified immunity”) reduces both errors and crimes when competence is observable. (JEL K4, K42, L5).
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1417-1436 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 4 Dec 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2018 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business,Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics
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Ajit Mishra
- Department of Economics - Head of Department
- Centre for Development Studies
- Centre for Governance, Regulation and Industrial Strategy
- Economic Theory
- Public and Environmental Economics
Person: Research & Teaching