Interest group size and legislative lobbying

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Abstract

We develop a model of legislative decision making in which lobbying and public policy are jointly determined. We examine how policy outcomes depend on the sizes of the interest groups. While a larger size typically involves favorable effects on policy, we also identify threshold levels of interest-group size where a lobby will be harmed if it becomes larger. This may provide another rationale as to why some interests do not or not fully organize. Spending limits can remove adverse policy effects of interest-group size. However, this is not necessarily welfare improving. Moreover, we find that endogenous proposal making may turn a econd-mover advantage in standard legislative lobbying models into a second-mover disadvantage.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)29 - 41
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume106
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014

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Group size
Lobbying
Interest groups
Public policy
Disadvantage
Decision making
Lobbies
Rationale

Keywords

  • Interest groups
  • Legislative lobbying
  • Political Economy
  • Vote buying

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Interest group size and legislative lobbying. / Schneider, Maik.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 106, 10.2014, p. 29 - 41.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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