Abstract
Utilitarian ethical theories argue that the morality of actions depends on their consequences for impartially maximizing overall welfare. Recent research suggests that individual differences in utilitarian tendencies fall along two dimensions: a permissive attitude toward harming others for greater good (instrumental harm [IH]) and an impartial concern for others’ welfare (impartial beneficence [IB]). We hypothesize that these dimensions operate as intuitive theories in the moral domain, framing distinctive patterns ofmoral judgments and behavior. Using intersubject representational similarity analysis of behavioral data (N = 254), we found that when participants shared endorsement of instrumental harm or impartial beneficence, they showed similar patterns of moral judgment and decision making. Intersubject representational similarity analysis of functional neuroimaging data (N = 68) revealed that participants with similar endorsement of instrumental harm or impartial beneficence showed similar neural encoding of moral choice attributes, even when they made different choices. Meanwhile, participantswith dissimilar endorsement of these dimensions showed distinctive neural encoding of moral choice attributes, even when they made similar choices. These similarity and dissimilarity patterns emerged in distinct brain regions for instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. Together, our findings suggest that instrumental harm and impartial beneficence distinctively frame cognitive representations of moral decision problems, over and above guiding judgments and decisions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3217-3232 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Journal of Experimental Psychology : General |
| Volume | 154 |
| Issue number | 11 |
| Early online date | 1 Nov 2025 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Because this research was funded in whole, or in part, by Wellcome Trust (Grant 204826/Z/16/Z), for the purpose of open access, the author has applied a CC BY public copyright license to any author accepted manuscript version arising from this submission.Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the members of Crockett Lab, Robb Rutledge, Michel-Pierre Coll, and Diana Tamir, for helpful discussions on this work.Funding
These results have not been disseminated or published elsewhere. The authors declare no competing interests. This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation (Beacons Project and No. 61495), Academy of Medical Sciences (Grant SBF001\1008), John Fell Fund, University of Oxford, and Wellcome Trust (Grant 204826/Z/16/Z) awarded to M. J. Crockett; Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies awarded to Yoonseo Zoh; Royal Society (Grant NF160700) and Yale University (Theresa Seessel Endowed Fellowship) awarded to Hongbo Yu; Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council David Philips Fellowship (BB/R010668/2) awarded to Matthew A. J. Apps.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council | BB/R010668/2 |
| Royal Society | NF160700 |
| The Wellcome Trust | 204826/Z/16/Z |
Keywords
- utilitarianism
- moral cognition
- moral psychology
- neuroimaging
- social neuroscience
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