Independent service operators in ATM markets

Tobias Wenzel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)
83 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of entry of non-banks (termed Independent Service Operators, ISOs) into ATM markets. We compare two different regimes by which the ISO may generate income: (1) The ISO receives interchange fees and (2) the ISO charges consumers directly. We find that due to the entry of an ISO, the size of the total ATM network increases independent of the way the ISO is financed. Account fees increase if the ISO receives interchange fees and decrease if the ISO charges consumers directly. Consumers may not benefit from the entry of the ISO. If a regulator can control the interchange fee, entry by an ISO financed through interchange fees increases consumer surplus, while the entry of a surcharging ISO decreases consumer surplus.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)26-47
Number of pages22
JournalScottish Journal of Political Economy
Volume61
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2014

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market
fee
Operator
Asynchronous transfer mode
regime
income
Interchange fee

Cite this

Independent service operators in ATM markets. / Wenzel, Tobias.

In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, No. 1, 02.2014, p. 26-47.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Wenzel, Tobias. / Independent service operators in ATM markets. In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2014 ; Vol. 61, No. 1. pp. 26-47.
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